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New Privacy Guides article 🔐✊
by me:

Encryption Is Not a Crime

The war against encryption isn't new, but the quantity of data about us that needs protection is.

Despite the senseless attacks,
it is vital that we fight back to protect the right to using end-to-end encryption.

Encryption protects us all: privacyguides.org/articles/202

www.privacyguides.org · Encryption Is Not a Crime
Mehr von Em :official_verified:
Antwortete im Thread

@LukaszOlejnik
Part of the proposed changes relates to how orgs are classified and governed under the existing surveillance law.
In the proposed revision, smaller Digital Service Providers such as Threema and Proton would be subjected to similar surveillance rules (and deadlines) as the bigger ISPs today.

They are against it, fearing (rightly) that it would impose significant costs on them, to handle authorities' requests and develop/deploy/maintain a surveillance infrastructure comparable to that already in place at bigger companies and ISPs such as Swisscom, Salt, etc.

The other change of the proposition, is the access of (near) real time metadata.

On the positive side, e2ee and message contents are explicitly excluded from the surveillance.

I'm curious to see what the final proposition will look like regarding the SMEs.

Sigh. We are, as a security community, making good progress on some old as well as some new topics. #Rust, #Go, and other memory safe systems languages are going well and having a real impact in reducing memory safety issues - which has been the most important security bug class for decades, and we are finally improving! Compartmentalization and isolation of processes and services have now become common knowledge and the minimum bar for new designs. Security and privacy by design are being honored in many new projects, and not just as lip service, but because the involved developers deeply believe in these principles nowadays. #E2EE is finally available to most end-users, both for messaging and backups.

And again and again, we are forced into having discussions (theregister.com/2025/04/03/eu_) about breaking all the progress.

Let me be clear for Nth time:
* We *cannot* build encryption systems that can only be broken by the "good guys". If they are not completely secure, foreign enemy states, organized crime, and intimate partners will break and abuse them as well. There is no halfway in this technology. Either it is secure or it isn't - for and against everybody.
* We *cannot* build safe, government-controlled censorship filters into our global messaging apps that are not totally broken under the assumption of (current or future) bad government policies and/or insider attacks at the technology providers (mayrhofer.eu.org/talk/insider-). Either one-to-one communication remains secure and private, or it doesn't (ins.jku.at/chatcontrol/).
* We *cannot* allow exploitation of open security vulnerabilities in smartphones or other devices for law enforcement. If they are not closed, they are exploitable by everybody. "Nobody but us" is an illusion, and makes everybody less secure.

My latest recorded public talk on the topic was mayrhofer.eu.org/talk/secure-m, and nothing factual has changed since then. Policymakers keep asking for a different technological reality than the one we live in, and that sort of thing doesn't tend to produce good, sustainable outcomes.

(Edited to only fix a typo. No content changes.)

CC @epicenter_works @edri @suka_hiroaki @heisec @matthew_d_green @ilumium

The Register · EU: These are scary times – let's backdoor encryption!Von Iain Thomson
Antwortete Scimmia di Mare

@Madmonkey @kenobit

Sorry, if I misintpret your post, trying to understand Italian based on my mediocre Spanish 🙂

#XMPP itself does not define #e2ee, but almost all clients do support #OMEMO encryption, which is more or less copied from Signal.

In addition, you can choose a trustworthy provider, such a #cooperative or club.

Maybe for that reasons, German #police seems to believe (wrongly), that #Jabber (the traditional name of XMPP) were "the first pillar of #cybercrime"!

Die #DVD hat zusammen mit über 235 NGO, akademischen und Cybersicherheits-Experten sowie Unternehmen einen offenen Brief zum schwedischen Gesetzentwurf zur Datenspeicherung und zum Zugriff auf elektrische Informationen an die Mitglieder des schwedischen Reichstags unterzeichnet, der heute versandt wurde.
Wir kämpfen weiter gegen die Versuche der Schwächung der Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung (#E2EE).
Zum offenen Brief:
datenschutzverein.de/2025/04/o

www.datenschutzverein.deOffener Brief zum schwedischen Gesetzentwurf zur Datenspeicherung und zum Zugriff auf elektrische Informationen – Deutsche Vereinigung für Datenschutz e.V.
Fortgeführter Thread

Earlier this year, the UK government ordered Apple to grant it access to encrypted data stored by Apple users worldwide in its cloud service.

The secret order was made under the Investigatory Powers Act and the government has tried to keep the public in the dark ever since. Even when Apple appealed the order.

Now there will be some level of transparency with today's decision.

reuters.com/technology/apple-a

#encryption#e2ee#apple

BREAKING: The UK government's attempt to hold the Apple encryption case entirely in secret has been REJECTED.

ORG, Big Brother Watch and Index on Censorship made a submission to the court arguing for open justice.

In a win for privacy rights, the court agrees.

It said it didn't accept “that the revelation of the bare details of the case would be damaging to the public interest or prejudicial to national security”.

openrightsgroup.org/press-rele

Open Rights GroupIPT supports ORG’s call for open hearing in Apple encryption caseThe court responsible for hearing Apple’s challenge against the UK Government demanding that it breaks encryption has rejected the Home Office’s bid to have the case heard in secret.
#apple#encryption#e2ee

If you're using #GMail and you've learned about their latest claim to introduce real end-to-end #encryption: it's a lie.

Google has the control and/or you can't do anything against that Google takes control any time.

Real #E2EE works differently: only the sender and receiver are able to access the protected content.

arstechnica.com/security/2025/

michal.sapka.pl/2025/gmail-e2e

#Meta also defined E2EE such that the message is encrypted from the sender to them, processed in clear text and re-encrypted for the transmission to the receiver.

Don't let them fool you with false claims and wrong definitions.

Ars Technica · Are new Google E2EE emails really end-to-end encrypted? Kinda, but not really.Von Dan Goodin
#Google#security#privacy